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Abstract—Convolutional and recurrent neural networks have
been widely employed to achieve state-of-the-art performance
on classification tasks. However, it has also been noted that
these networks can be manipulated adversarially with relative
ease, by carefully crafted additive perturbations to the input.
Though several experimentally established prior works exist on
crafting and defending against attacks, it is also desirable to have
theoretical guarantees on the existence of adversarial examples
and robustness margins of the network to such examples. We
provide both in this paper. We focus specifically on recurrent
architectures and draw inspiration from dynamical systems
theory to naturally cast this as a control problem, allowing us to
dynamically compute adversarial perturbations at each timestep
of the input sequence, thus resembling a feedback controller.
Illustrative examples are provided to supplement the theoretical
discussions.
Index Terms—Adversarial examples, Recurrent neural net-
work, Control synthesis, Dynamical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
ADVERSARIAL attacks on neural networks, and tech-niques to robustify against such attacks, have been a topic
of continued interest in the machine learning communities.
A wide variety of methodologies has been presented in the
past, for crafting adversarial input disturbances. These broadly
fall under one category or another based on the information
available to the attacker regarding the neural network being at-
tacked. For example, widely known methods like Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [1] or Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack
[2], Jacobian-based saliency map attack [3] to name a few,
were developed considering a white-box attack model. Others
like [4], [5], [6], [7] work for black-box attacks. ‘Transfer
attack’ models like [8] do not assume knowledge of the model
but require the training data. As far as the applications are
concerned, the majority of prior works focus on computer
vision [9], [10], [1], wherein given a feed-forward network
(usually a convolutional neural network (CNN)) and an input
image, an adversarial disturbance is crafted to fool the network
on image classification tasks. A small few, like [11], have
considered attacks on Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs),
although their algorithm requires unfolding the RNN first, thus
resembling a feed-forward network in practice. Observations
drawn from these prior empirically-supported algorithms and
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) Proposed algorithm for RNNs dynamically computes the adversar-
ial disturbance at each timestep enabling ‘real-time’ injection of adversarial
perturbation (b) By contrast, a prior algorithm, such as FGSM, would
require the entire input sequence collated together, before it can compute
the perturbation.
results have often led to conflicting conclusions. For instance,
works such as [12], [13] speculate that adversarial examples
are confined to tight “pockets" due to the highly nonlinear
data manifold that the network represents, whereas [1] have
argued that it is in fact the contrary, i.e., “models being
too linear" is what gives rise to adversarial examples. This
motivates the need for a more rigorous mathematical formu-
lation of the adversarial perturbation problem, which would
hopefully shed light on how the input perturbations impact
the network output from the nominal input, and under what
conditions adversarial perturbations are guaranteed to exist.
From myriad experimentation in previous work, it appears that
any given input can be perturbed adversarially using some
simple gradient-based disturbance. A complementary line of
work, on defense methodologies against adversarial inputs, has
been considered by [14], [15], [16], with the simplest approach
being augmentation of training data with adversarial examples.
In this paper, we consider white-box attacks specifically
on RNN models and demonstrate how their recurrent nature
can also be utilized to compute disturbances dynamically.
This is the key difference from (very limited) prior works
on adversarial attack algorithms applicable to RNNs. The
contributions of our paper are as follows:
∙ We present an algorithm to sequentially generate adversar-
ial perturbations for RNNs. In other words, the 푘푡ℎ input
푥̃(푘) of the adversarial sequence is generated in constant
time using just the 푘푡ℎ input 푥(푘) of the nominal sequence,
2and the 푘푡ℎ hidden states. This means that sequential
inputs can be adversarially perturbed one timestep at a
time, rather than collecting the entire sequence. Figure
1 illustrates this point. This in principle, means that
adversarial noise can be injected into real-time signals
like speech commands. Our method is also amenable for
scenarios with very long input sequences, as it would
scale linearly with sequence length.
∙ We present a control theory-based analysis to explain
how the proposed disturbance sequence, viewed as a
feedback control law, steers the state trajectories of the
adversarially perturbed system away from the nominal,
unperturbed states. Also, viewed in this manner as a
dynamical system, we show how the problem of finding
adversarial perturbations can be formulated as an optimal
control problem, which enables us to use an off-the-shelf
control toolbox for crafting adversarial examples.
∙ Finally, a constructive proof regarding the existence of
adversarial perturbations is provided. In particular, we
present conditions under which one can always find an
adversarial perturbation to a given nominal input. Since
these results are analytical in nature, the conditions may
be used in robust training of RNNs by directly imposing
constraints on the training parameters.
In order to better elucidate the dynamical system analysis
in the sections to follow, we begin with a concrete example of
a sequence classification task, and how the RNN classifier can
be seen as a time-varying nonlinear system, with disturbance
acting as a control input. The formal analysis results will
be presented in Section IV. Later, we shall experimentally
demonstrate our approach of crafting adversarial perturbations
to a variety of RNN classification examples covering different
network architectures and sizes, in Section V, namely: (a)
Frequency discrimination using Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
architecture, (b) MNIST digit classification using vanilla RNN,
(c) Human activity recognition using GRU, and (d) IMDb
movie review classification using Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) architecture.
II. TIME SERIES CLASSIFICATION TASK
One of the key applications of RNNs is sequence classifica-
tion where the input-output map is “many-to-one." Commonly
used examples in the literature include sentiment analysis
(IMDB reviews or Twitter), MNIST digit recognition, human
activity recognition (HAR), handwriting recognition (IAM On-
Line Handwriting Database), urban sound classification etc.
The example we use to motivate the discussion to follow, is
the ‘frequency discrimination task’ [17], [18]. In this task, the
RNN classifier is to classify sinusoidal input sequences based
on their time period 푇 into two classes, as shown in Figure 2.
Details on the model and training can be found in Section V,
but in this section, we shall refer to this toy example to build
a basic background.
III. PERTURBING THE INPUTS FOR MISCLASSIFICATION
The goal of an adversarial attack is to modify the inputs in
a way that is indistinguishable to a human, but lead the neural
Fig. 2. Toy example of RNN classification task (Frequency discrimination).
network to have a very different behaviour. Let us start with
the compact representation of a RNN:
ℎ(푘 + 1) = 푓̂ (ℎ(푘), 푥(푘)), ℎ(0) = fixed (1)
푦(푘) = 푔̂(ℎ(푘)). (2)
where ℎ(푘) ∈ ℝ푛 is the hidden state vector and 푥(푘) ∈ ℝ푚
is the RNN input. The output vector 푦(푘) ∈ ℝ푙 for an RNN
classifier is interpreted as a probability distribution over the 푙
classes.
For the classification task in Figure 2, for example, the function
푓̂ represents a GRU layer and 푔̂ represents a softmax layer,
with 푛 = 2, 푚 = 1, and 푙 = 2. The phase plot of the network
(ℎ(푘) trajectories) corresponding to input signals belonging to
the two classes are shown in Figure 3(a). Plotted in Figure 3(b)
are the respective classification probabilities of signals (i.e., the
first component of output vector 푦(푘) for class 0 signals and
second component for class 1 signals), which appear to be
uniformly lower bounded by some monotonically increasing
function.
We convert our RNN equation to a continuous time system
for the convenience of analysis as
푑ℎ
푑푡
= 푓 (ℎ, 푥) = 1
Δ
(푓̂ (ℎ, 푥) − ℎ), ℎ(0) = ℎ0, (3)
where the state ℎ(푡) ∈ ℝ푛, and the control input 푥(푡) ∈ ℝ푚,
and Δ is a small positive constant. Let us say the RNN is
trained to classify input sequences belonging to set  into two
classes. Further, let there be two sets of input signals, denoted
by 푎,푏 s.t. 푎⋃푏 =  , and open sets 핊푎,핊푏 ∈ ℝ푛 suchthat if 푥푎(푡) ∈ 푎 then the corresponding state trajectory ℎ푎(푡)of system (3) converges to the interior of the set 핊푎. Similarly
ℎ푏(푡) corresponding to any 푥푏(푡) ∈ 푏 converges to 핊푏. Inour frequency discriminator example, the sets 핊푎,핊푏 can betaken to be the two half-planes whose boundaries are the
‘0.99’ and ‘0.11’ lines respectively (shaded regions in green
and blue), in Figure 3(a). Additionally, motivated by Figure
3(b), let us define a Lyapunov-like function 푉 (ℎ) supported
on 핊′푎 such that 푊 (푡) > 푉 (ℎ푎(푡)) > 0 whenever ℎ푎(푡) ∉ 핊푎,where 푊 (푡) is a monotonically decreasing function.
Given input 푥푎(푡) ∈ 푎, our goal is to find a perturbation
푑(푡) to 푥푎(푡) such that the corresponding trajectory no longerconverges to 핊푎, and possibly, converges to 핊푏. In other words,if we consider solution ℎ(푡) given by
ℎ̇(푡) = 푓 (ℎ(푡), 푥푎(푡) + 푑(푡)), ℎ(0) = ℎ0 (4)
3(a) Phase plot of RNN classifier for frequency discrimination
example. ℎ1 and ℎ2 are the components of the two dimensional
state vector ℎ.
(b) RNN output vector 푦 = (푦0, 푦1) denotes the classification
probability corresponding to each of the two classes.
Fig. 3. (a) All the 100 trajectories (50 from each input class) start at the point
[0.4917,−0.0038] marked by the black star. Solid black lines show the level
sets of the classification probability corresponding to class 1 (for example,
the inputs corresponding to the green trajectories crossing the 0.99 line are
classified as class 1 with more than 99% confidence). (b) Corresponding
classifier confidence in classifying the class 0 inputs as class 0.
then we want 푉 (ℎ(푡)) > 휖 for all times 푡, and some positive
constant 휖. In order to lead the network to misclassification,
we need a stronger condition, i.e., given a 푥푎(푡) ∈ 푎 wewant 푑(푡) subject to 푥푎(푡) + 푑(푡) ∈ 푏.
We start with
ℎ̇1(푡) = 푓 (ℎ1(푡), 푥푎(푡)) (5)
ℎ̇2(푡) = 푓 (ℎ2(푡), 푥푎(푡) + 푑(푡))
ℎ1(0) = ℎ2(0)
along with
0 < 푉 (ℎ1(푡)) < 푊 (푡).
Then, along the trajectory ℎ2(푡), we have
푉̇ (ℎ2(푡)) =
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 ℎ̇2(푡)
=
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎 + 푑)
=
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 (푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎) +
(∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))푑 + o(‖푑‖))
≃
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎) +
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 (∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))푑. (6)
Let us define the term 푔(ℎ, 푢) ≐ (∇ℎ푉 (ℎ))푇 푓 (ℎ, 푢), so thefirst term in the last line of equation (6) is equal to 푔(ℎ2, 푥푎).Now, using the Mean-Value Theorem, we get
푔(ℎ2, 푥푎) = 푔(ℎ1, 푥푎) +
(
∇ℎ푔(ℎ̃, 푥푎)
)푇 (ℎ2 − ℎ1),
for some ℎ̃ = ℎ1+훼(ℎ2−ℎ1), 훼 ∈ (0, 1). Substituting this intoequation (6) yields,
푉̇ (ℎ2(푡)) ≃
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 푓 (ℎ1, 푥푎) + (7)[
∇2ℎ푉 (ℎ̃) ⋅ 푓 (ℎ̃, 푥푎) + ∇ℎ푓 (ℎ̃, 푥푎) ⋅ ∇ℎ푉 (ℎ̃)
]푇 (ℎ2 − ℎ1)
+
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 (∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))푑
= 푉̇ (ℎ1(푡))
⏟⏞⏟⏞⏟
≤0
+
(
∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2)
)푇 (∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))푑 +
[
∇2ℎ푉 (ℎ̃) ⋅ 푓 (ℎ̃, 푥푎) + ∇ℎ푓 (ℎ̃, 푥푎) ⋅ ∇ℎ푉 (ℎ̃)
]푇
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
bounded
(ℎ2 − ℎ1).
At this point, we note that choosing
푑 = 푑(푡) = 훼(sign((∇ℎ푉 (ℎ2))푇 (∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))))푇 , (8)
for some small positive 훼, would be an appropriate choice in
making 푉 (ℎ2(푡)) increase (instantaneously) at time 푡. Indeed,we can make our frequency discriminator RNN misclassify
and assign very high probability to the incorrect class by
choosing such a disturbance, as shown in the next two figures.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. (a) Input sequence belonging to class 0 in green (correctly classified
with > 95% confidence) is misclassified as class 1 when perturbed slightly,
in red (with very high confidence of > 99%). (b) Lyapunov-like function
decreases along the nominal trajectories (green), but increases along the
perturbed one.
4(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) Input sequence belonging to class 1 in green (correctly classified
with > 99% confidence) is misclassified as class 0 when perturbed slightly,
in red (with very high confidence of > 95%). (b) Lyapunov-like function
decreases along the nominal trajectories (green), but increases along the
perturbed one.
Figures 4 and 5 show how the addition of the adversarial
disturbance given by equation (8) (with 훼 = 0.15) to the nom-
inal input impacts the network. The Lyapunov-like function
푉 shown in Figure 4 is chosen (among many other ways) as
follows:
푉 (ℎ) = max
(
0,
[
1
0
]푇
푦(ℎ) − 푦̄
)2
, (9)
푦̄ = threshold = 0.9.
Since only the direction of ∇ℎ푉 is relevant, we can useany affine transformation of 푉 (ℎ) given in equation (9), as
indicated in Figure 5.
Before we move to the main result and continue with the
analysis in the next section, it is important to note at this point
that such a gradient-based attack on RNNs is different from
previous work on adversarial attacks on feedforward NNs, like
CNNs for image-classification. This is because the adversarial
input disturbances are applied sequentially at each time, and
the disturbance at time 푘 would depend on the disturbance at
previous times implicitly through its dependence on the state
trajectory ℎ(푘) (as they are influenced by past input distur-
bances). For attacks in CNNs, for example, the disturbance to
each pixel is computed simply based on a gradient around
the current value of the pixels, and therefore these pixel-
wise disturbances do not affect one another. Another practical
difference in our disturbance computation for RNNs compared
to previous methods, is that disturbances at time step 푘 are
computed without any knowledge of future inputs. Previous
attacks are limited in the sense that one would require to
collate the inputs at all timesteps before computing the dis-
turbance, thus prohibiting ‘real-time’ injection of disturbance
to the inputs.
In the next section, we show the worst case effect of the input
disturbance given by equation (8). The main result of this
paper is also presented.
IV. EXISTENCE OF ADVERSARIAL DISTURBANCE
As we mentioned earlier, in this section, we present the
existence results for adversarial perturbations in RNNs. But
let us first look at how the effect of disturbance (8) can be
upper bounded. Robustification against adversarial attacks can
then be translated to making this upper bound smaller.
Thus, returning back to equation (7), let us simplify the
expressions by considering 푉 (ℎ) = 푎푇ℎ + 푏, i.e., to be linear,
so we get ∇푉 = 푎 and ∇2푉 = 0. One can then integrate both
sides of equation (7) and obtain:
푎푇ℎ2(푡) = 푎푇ℎ1(푡) (10)
+ ∫
푡
0
(∇ℎ푓 (ℎ̃, 푥푎)푎)푇 (ℎ2(푠) − ℎ1(푠))푑푠
+ ∫
푡
0
훼‖푎푇 (∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))‖1푑푠.
Using the Bellman-Grönwall inequality we then obtain:|푎|푚푖푛 ⋅ ‖ℎ2(푡) − ℎ1(푡)‖ (11)
≤ ‖푎‖∫ 푡0 ‖∇ℎ푓 (ℎ̃, 푥푎)‖⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
훽(푡), bounded
‖(ℎ2(푠) − ℎ1(푠))‖푑푠
+ ‖푎‖∫ 푡0 훼‖(∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))‖1푑푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
≐훾(푡)
⟹
|푎|푚푖푛‖푎‖ ‖ℎ2(푡) − ℎ1(푡)‖ ≤ 훾(푡) exp
(
∫
푡
0
훽(푠)푑푠
)
,
where |푎|푚푖푛 is the minimum over the absolute values of theelements of vector 푎. It may be of our interest to note that the
term 훽(푡) which enters exponentially is more critical than the
term 훾(푡) which impacts the separation of the two trajectories
only linearly, as is the case in linear systems. In this sense,
the weights associated with the states more critically impact
the state trajectories compared to the weights associated with
the input.
A. Lower-bounding trajectory separations using Matrix mea-
sures
Previously, we presented how a gradient based disturbance
may reasonably lead the perturbed system to diverge from the
nominal system. The upper bound in equation (11), defines
the largest divergence that the input disturbance can produce,
but since such estimates are norm based, they are usually
conservative. Matrix measures provide a tighter estimation of
5system trajectories [19], since they are not norm based and
can therefore be positive or negative.
The matrix measure of a matrix 퐴, with induced norm ‖ ⋅‖
is defined as 휇(퐴) ≐ lim휃→0+ ‖퐼+휃퐴‖−‖퐼‖휃 , and always exists.Given a system
ℎ̇ = 퐴(푡)ℎ(푡),
one may bound its solutions using Coppel’s inequality as
‖ℎ(푡)‖ ≥ ‖ℎ(푡0)‖ exp∫ 푡푡0 −휇(−퐴(푠))푑푠 (12)‖ℎ(푡)‖ ≤ ‖ℎ(푡0)‖ exp∫ 푡푡0 휇(퐴(푠))푑푠.
In order to be able to apply this to our system, we first start
by writing equation (5) in terms of 푒(푡) ≐ ℎ2(푡) − ℎ1(푡) as
푒̇(푡) = ℎ̇2(푡) − ℎ̇1(푡) = 푓 (ℎ2, 푥 + 훿) − 푓 (ℎ1, 푥) (13)
= 푓 (ℎ2, 푥) − 푓 (ℎ1, 푥) + 푓 (ℎ2, 푥 + 훿) − 푓 (ℎ2, 푥)
=
[
∫
1
0
∇ℎ푓 (ℎ1 + 휆푒, 푥)푑휆
]
푒(푡)
+
[
∫
1
0
∇푥푓 (ℎ1 + 푒, 푥 + 휆훿)푑휆
]
훿(푡)
= 퐴(푡, 푒)푒(푡) + 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿)훿(푡),
and 푒(0) = 0. Once 푒 becomes non-zero, a sufficient conditions
for the trajectories ℎ1, ℎ2 to continue diverging even withoutdisturbance (i.e., 훿 set to zero), is when the matrix measure
휇(−퐴(푡, 푒)) is negative for all 푡, 푒. This sufficient condition
is easy to obtain in analytical form, as illustrated by the
following example.
Example 1. Let us consider the vanilla RNN architecture
given by
ℎ(푘 + 1) = tanh (푈ℎ(푘) +푊 푥(푘) + 푏)
which is approximated in continuous time as
ℎ̇ = 1
푇
(tanh (푈ℎ +푊 푥 + 푏) − ℎ).
Then, the term 퐴(푡, 푒) is given by
1
푇 ∫
1
0
(
푑푖푎푔
[
1 − tanh2((1 − 휆)푈ℎ1 + 휆푈ℎ2 +푊 푥 + 푏)
]
푈 − 퐼
)
푑휆.
We now choose our vector norm to be the infinity norm,
and define the matrix norm and the matrix measure using this
norm. Then, we get
0 > 휇(−퐴(푡, 푒)) (14)
⟸ 0 > 휇
(
퐼 − diag [1 − tanh2(푈ℎ +푊 푥 + 푏)]푈)
∀ℎ ∈ [−1, 1]푛
⟸ 0 > 휇
(
diag [1 − tanh2(푈ℎ +푊 푥 + 푏)]−1 − 푈)
∀ℎ ∈ [−1, 1]푛.
We then obtain, [1 − tanh2(푈푖ℎ +푊푖푥 + 푏푖)]−1+∑푗≠푖 |푈푖푗| <
푈푖푖, ∀ℎ ∈ [−1, 1]푛, ∀푖 = 1, 2, ..., 푛 ⟹ 휇(−퐴(푡, 푒)) <
0. The inequality on the left-hand side can be numerically
verified to hold whenever
2‖푈푖‖1 +푊푖푥 + 푏푖 + 0.8 < 2푈푖푖.
B. Constructing the adversarial perturbation
We now look at the disturbance term in last line of
equation (13). Since the input disturbance appears in a
nonlinear fashion on the left hand side of equation (13),
we present the following proposition, which allows us to
transform the input 훿(푡) into another input that enters the
systems in an affine fashion.
Proposition 1: Consider the term 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿)훿 on the left-hand
side of equation (13). For any given bounded vector 푣 ∈ ℝ푛
and 푡 ∈ ℝ, there exist 푤 and some scalar 훼 > 0 such that
푤 = 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푤)푇 푣
if ∇2푥푓푖 is bounded for every 푖 = 1, 2, ..., 푛.
Proof Our proof relies on using the Contraction Mapping
Theorem to show that the function (푧) = 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푧)푇 푣
defined on ℝ푛 has a (unique) fixed-point 푤, for some scalar
훼 > 0. If ‖′(푧)‖ = 훼‖ 푑퐵(푡,푒,푧)푇 푣푑푧 ‖ < 1 uniformly for all
푧, then the map  is a contraction. We then only need to
show that ‖ 푑푑푧퐵(푡, 푒, 푧)푇 푣‖ is uniformly bounded, as 훼 > 0can be chosen arbitrarily small to make the product less than
1. Clearly, 푑푑푧퐵(푡, 푒, 푧)푇 푣 =
∑푛
푖=1 푣푖 ∫ 10 ∇2푢푓푖(ℎ1+푒, 푥+휆푧)휆푑휆.This means
‖ 푑
푑푧
퐵(푡, 푒, 푧)푇 푣‖ ≤ 푛∑
푖=1
|푣푖|∫ 10 ‖∇2푥푓푖(ℎ1 + 푒, 푥+ 휆푧)‖푑휆
which is bounded when 푣 and ∇2푥푓푖 are bounded. □
We can now use Proposition 1 to craft an adversarial pertur-
bation as follows. For our system (5) (and any other RNN
system in general), since the function 푓 satisfies the condition
in Proposition 1 (on boundedness of the Hessian), then for
any bounded 휈(푡) ∈ ℝ푚 there exists a fixed-point 훿̄(푡) of the
function 훼퐵(푡, 푒, ⋅)푇 휈(푡) for some 훼 > 0. This fixed point may
be computed as the limit of the system
훿푛+1 = 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿푛)푇 휈(푡), (15)
as 푛 → ∞ due to the Contraction Mapping Theorem. In
particular, we can choose 휈(푡) to be equal to 푒(푡), which is
bounded from above due to the fact that the states of system
(5) evolve in a bounded region. Thus, we have
훿̄(푡) = 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇 푒(푡) (16)
and plugging this 훿̄ as the disturbance in equation (13) gives
us
푒̇(푡) = 퐴(푡, 푒)푒(푡) + 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)훿̄(푡) (17)
= 퐴(푡, 푒)푒(푡) + 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇 푒(푡)
=
[
퐴(푡, 푒) + 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇
]
푒(푡)
≐ 퐾(푡, 푒)푒(푡).
6Clearly, the second term in (17) with the adversarial distur-
bance 훿̄ leads 푒(푡) to diverge. This is because when we exclude
the first term, we get
푒̇(푡) = 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇 푒(푡)
⟹ 푒(푡)푇 푒̇(푡) = 훼‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇 푒(푡)‖2
⟹ 푑
푑푡
‖푒(푡)‖2 = 2훼‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇 푒(푡)‖2 ≥ 0.
We can now summarize the discussions in this subsection
into the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Let us consider an RNN represented by the
equation 푑푑푡ℎ(푡) = 푓 (ℎ(푡), 푥(푡)), with some fixed initial state
ℎ(0). For any given nominal input 푥1(푡), and correspondingstate trajectory ℎ1(푡), there exists some input perturbation 훿(푡)such that the state ℎ2(푡) of the perturbed system correspondingto input 푥1(푡) + 훿(푡) monotonically diverges if the matrixmeasure 휇(−퐴(푡, 푒)) < 0.
Finally let us draw a connection between the “fixed-point"
adversarial disturbance proposed in this section and the
gradient based disturbance (8) described in Section III. It can
be shown that one is the limiting case of the other. This to
a certain extent helps experimentally corroborate the proofs
and results in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, since gradient
based perturbation in the previous section was already shown
to be an effective adversarial attack.
Proposition 2: The perturbation 훿̄, computed using equation
(16), approaches the gradient based perturbation
훿(푡) = (∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥푎))푇 푒(푡)
in direction, (i.e., 훿̄ ∥ 훿). Thus, taking 푉 = 12 (ℎ2 − ℎ1)2,disturbance (8) and disturbance (16) have the same sign.
Proof We start by looking at the direction of 훿̄ satisfying
equation (16) as 훼 approaches zero. Clearly, since
퐵(푡, 푒, ⋅)푇 푒(푡) is a bounded function, 훼 → 0 ⟹ 훿̄ → 0 which
by continuity of 퐵, implies 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿̄)푇 푒(푡) → 퐵(푡, 푒, 0)푇 푒(푡),
and this further implies 훿̄ → 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 0)푒(푡).
Next we note that by definition, 퐵(푡, 푒, 0) =∫ 10 ∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥)푑휆 = ∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥). Thus, we get
훼 → 0 ⟹ 훿̄ → 훼∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥)푇 푒(푡). This means
훿̄ ∥ ∇푥푓 (ℎ2, 푥)푇 푒(푡) as 훼 → 0. □The next section presents a way to simplify the computation
of the fixed-point disturbance and presents some analysis on
how this new disturbance converges to the manifold given by
(16), while leading ‖푒‖ to grow.
C. Dynamic computation of adversarial disturbance
The dynamics of error 푒(푡) driven by the input disturbance
푑(푡) is described by a continuous-time differential equation
(13), whereas the input disturbance (16) needs to be computed
at each (continuous) time instant 푡 by solving the implicit
algebraic equation (16). Although this computation can be
done in a straightforward manner using the globally con-
verging discrete-time difference equation (15) if performed at
a timescale faster than the error dynamics, this discrepancy
between continuous versus discrete dynamics needs to be
handled in a more formal manner.
Our aim in this section is to derive an ordinary differential
equation (ODE) 푑훿푑푡 = 휙(푡, 푒, 훿) that determines the evolution ofadversarial disturbance in continuous time, consistent with the
continuous error dynamics. We would ideally want the solution
of this ODE to evolve in the manifold given by equation
(16). One way to achieve this, is perhaps with sliding mode
controller 푢 = 휙(푡, 푒, 훿) that takes 훿(푡) to the manifold (16) in
finite time and keeps it on that manifold thereafter. However,
such a controller would not be very encouraging as far as
practical implementation is concerned, since we would need
to compute gradients of each element of matrix 퐵.
We start with the differential equation (13), along with the
ODE
휖 푑훿
푑푡
= 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿)푇 푒 − 훿, (18)
where 휖 is a positive constant. Let 훿(푡) = ℎ(푡, 푒) be the explicit
solution of the equation (16), and 훿(푡, 휖) be the solution of
equation (18). Note that by setting 휖 = 0, one obtains what
is called in control theory literature, a ‘singularly perturbed’
system [20] described by the original set of equations (13) and
(16). So, it is reasonable to expect that the disturbance 훿(푡, 휖)
would also act as an adversarial disturbance for sufficiently
small values of 휖. We can now introduce a new variable
푦(푡, 휖) = 훿(푡, 휖) − ℎ(푡, 푒). Then, the following holds.
Theorem 2: Given the systems (13) and (18)
푒̇(푡) = 퐴(푡, 푒)푒(푡) + 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿)훿(푡)
휖훿̇(푡) = 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿)푇 푒 − 훿,
the term 푦(푡, 휖) satisfies the exponentially decaying bound‖푦(푡, 휖)‖ ≤ 푘1 exp ( − 푘2휖 푡)‖푦0‖ + 푘3휖 ∀푡 > 0 globallyi.e., for any initial condition ‖푦0‖, and uniform constants
푘1, 푘2, 푘3 > 0.
Proof Please see Appendix.
Corollary 1: Given any time 푇 > 0, 휂 > 0 and initial
condition 푦0, there exists a 휖′ such that ‖푦(푡, 휖′)‖ ≤ 휂 for all
푡 > 푇 .
Let us now look at how the disturbance 훿(푡, 휖) affects
term ‖푒(푡)‖. We recall that our goal is to find adversarial
disturbances to the input such that the two trajectories ℎ1 and
ℎ2 diverge. Focusing just on the disturbance term, we have
1
2
푑
푑푡
‖푒‖2 = 푒푇 푒̇ = 푒푇퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))훿(푡, 휖)
= 푒푇퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))
[
훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒 +
훿(푡, 휖) − 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒
]
= 푒푇퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))
[
훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒 +
푦(푡, 휖) + ℎ(푡, 푒) − 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦(푡, 휖) +
ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒
]
.
From the definition of ℎ(푡, 푒), we know that ℎ(푡, 푒) =
훼퐵(푡, 푒, ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒. Furthermore in the proof of Proposition 1,
7훼‖퐵(푡, 푒, ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒‖ ≤ 12 by construction. Using these twofacts, we get
1
2
푑
푑푡
‖푒‖2
= 푒푇퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))
[
훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒 + 푦(푡, 휖)
+ℎ(푡, 푒) − 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦(푡, 휖) + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒
]
= 푒푇퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))
[
훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒 + 푦(푡, 휖)
+훼퐵(푡, 푒, ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒 − 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦(푡, 휖) + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒
]
≥ 훼‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖2 − ‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖ ⋅ ‖푦(푡, 휖)‖
−‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖ ⋅‖훼퐵(푡, 푒, ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒 − 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦(푡, 휖) + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒‖
≥ 훼‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖2 − ‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖ ⋅ ‖푦(푡, 휖)‖
−‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖ ⋅ (1
2
‖푦(푡, 휖)‖)
= ‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖(훼‖퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖))푇 푒‖ − 3
2
‖푦(푡, 휖)‖).
(19)
We want the right-hand side of the inequality above to be
non-negative and remain so after some point of time. From
corollary 1, the term ‖푦(푡, 휖)‖ can become arbitrarily small at
an exponential decay rate, if we choose 휖 small enough. This
decay of 푦(푡, 휖) is independent of 푒(푡). So if there exists some
휇1, 휇2 > 0 such that ‖푒(푡)‖ > 휇1 ⟹ ‖훼퐵(푡, 푒, 훿(푡, 휖)) > 휇2,then perhaps we can find an invariant set of the form{
(푡, 푒)|||‖푒‖ > 휇1, 푡 > 푡′} with ‖푒‖ increasing on this set.Indeed, such an argument can be made if the following mild
condition is satisfied:
Assumption 1: 퐵(푡, 푒, 0)푇 푒 = 푓푥(ℎ1(푡) + 푒, 푥(푡))푇 푒 is non-zero for all 푡 > 0 and 푒 ≠ 0.
Then, we can assure that the right-hand side of equa-
tion (19) eventually becomes strictly positive because of
the following. Say there exist a time 푡′ > 0 and 휇1 >
0 such that ‖푒(푡′)‖ > 휇1, (uniformly in 휖). Let us
define 휇2 ≐ min‖푒‖>휇1,푡>푡′
{‖훿‖|||훿 = 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿)푇 푒}. Note that
by Assumption 1, this means 휇2 > 0. Thus, we have
훼‖퐵(푡′, 푒(푡′), ℎ(푡′, 푒(푡′)))푇 푒(푡′)‖ = ‖ℎ(푡′, 푒(푡′))‖ > 휇2 >
0. Next, by continuity, there exists 푝, 푞 > 0 such
that 훼‖퐵(푡′, 푒(푡′), ℎ(푡′, 푒(푡′)) + 푦′)푇 푒(푡′)‖ ≥ 푝 whenever‖푦′‖ ≤ 푞. Using Corollary 1, we can always choose
an 휖 small enough such that ‖푦(푡′, 휖)‖ < min(푞, 23푝),and therefore ‖훼퐵(푡′, 푒(푡′), ℎ(푡′, 푒(푡′)) + 푦(푡′, 휖))푇 푒(푡′)‖ =‖훼퐵(푡′, 푒(푡′), 훿(푡′, 휖))푇 푒(푡′)‖ ≥ 푝 and therefore from the last
line of equation (19), we get
1
2
푑
푑푡
‖푒‖2 > 푝
훼
(푝 − 푝) = 0,
for all 푡 > 푡′. Thus, we concisely present the preceding
analysis as the following theorem.
Theorem 3: If 1) Assumption 1 holds, i.e., 퐵(푡, 푒, 0)푇 푒 = 0
only when 푒 = 0, and 2) matrix measure 휇(−퐴(푡, 푒)) < 0,
then ‖푒(푡)‖ diverges monotonically once it leaves the equilib-
rium point 푒 = 0.
Remarks on Assumption 1: The condition that 퐵(푡, 푒, 0)푇 푒 =
푓푥(ℎ1(푡) + 푒, 푥(푡))푇 푒 = 0 only for 푒 = 0, is very mild in thecase when size of the states of the system is equal to the input
size. In other words, when the Jacobian matrix 푓푥 is square.For example, in the case of the RNN architecture in Example
1, Assumption 1 can be easily verified to hold if the (square)
weight matrix 푊 is full-rank.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 6. (a) ’Fixed-point’ disturbance (dashed black line) computed using
equation (16) versus the dynamically computed disturbance (solid red line)
using equation (18). (b) The solution of ODE (18) converges to the solution
of the algebraic equation (16) as described in Theorem 2. (c) The green line
shows that the class 0 nominal signal is correctly assigned a low confidence
for class 1 (≈ 0.05) but assigned to class 1 with high confidence (> 0.99) after
adding the input disturbances (dashed-black line =‘Fixed-point disturbance’
and solid-red line=’Dynamic fixed-point disturbance’).
Figure 6 illustrates an example, using the frequency dis-
crimination task. A nominal input from class 0 injected with
disturbances computed using equations (16) and (18), causing
the network to misclassify it as class 1. In terms of runtime, the
‘dynamic fixed-point attack’ ((18)) was over 4× faster than the
‘fixed-point attack’ ((16)) in our Python implementation. The
initial condition for ODE (18) was chosen to be zero, and the
corresponding solution is denoted by 훿0(푡, 휖) in the figures.One can verify that the bound on ‖푦(푡, 휖)‖, described in
8Fig. 7. The solutions of ODE (18) are computed for 1000 randomly sampled
initial condition from a uniform distribution  (−1, 1). All of these 훿(푡, 휖)
were able to fool the network.
Theorem 2, indeed holds globally by comparing 훿0(푡, 휖) to thesolutions of ODE (18) starting at different initial conditions,
as show in Figure 7.
D. Optimal adversarial disturbance computation
We have already demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5 with
our simple frequency discriminator example that the gradient-
based disturbance (8) can adversarially perturb inputs from
both classes. But it may be of interest to explore optimally
computed disturbances to evaluate how the approaches pro-
posed in the previous subsections compare. Computation-wise,
our proposed approaches are clearly cheaper, and disturbances
can be injected in “real-time” since they only require the states
and nominal input at the current timestep instead of the entire
nominal state trajectory and input sequence. But it isn’t clear
how conservative our proposed method is, in terms of the size
of the disturbance needed to fool the classifier. We present here
our formulation for computing disturbances optimally, and a
demonstration on frequency discrimination task of Figure 2.
We first remind ourselves that the adversarial attack problem
for RNNs can be reframed as a control synthesis problem.
Given a nominal input sequence 푥푎(푡) for which we desireto generate an adversarial input 푑(푡), we can consider the
system (4) as a nonlinear, time-varying control system with
disturbance 푑(푡) as the control input. With such a system,
we can use some well-developed computational tools from
optimal control theory to generate adversarial disturbances.
More concretely, we can solve the following:
min
훿(푡)
−푉 (ℎ(푇 )) + ∫
푇
0
훿(푠)푇푅(푠)훿(푠)푑푠,
subject to :
푑
푑푡
ℎ = 푓̄ (푡, ℎ, 훿) = 푓 (ℎ(푡), 푥푎(푡) + 훿(푡)), ℎ(0) = ℎ0.
In order to force the adversarial disturbance to be bounded
within some prescribed 휖 > 0, we reparameterize the pertur-
bation term as 휖 tanh(훿(푡)) in place of 훿(푡).
Picking 푅 = 1 and 휖 = 0.15, we obtain these optimal pertur-
bations for misclassifying a randomly generated input signal
belonging to class 1 as class 0. The corresponding gradient-
based perturbation given by equation (8) is also computed.
Figure 8 shows results of the comparison. The sign change in
the gradient-sign based perturbation appears to coincide with
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 8. (a) Nominal input sequence belonging to class 1 is shown green. The
red and black dashed lines correspond to the gradient based and optimally
perturbed inputs, respectively. (b) The perturbations added to the nominal
input are shown in blue (gradient-sign) and black (optimal). (c) The nominal
input is correctly classified with > 99.8% confidence (green), whereas the
perturbed inputs are misclassified with very high confidence of > 94% (red
= gradient-sign, black = optimal perturbation).
the optimal perturbation, and performs equally well in leading
the network to misclassify. It is interesting to note in Figure
8(c) that the gradient-sign based perturbation is more greedy
in driving the network to misclassify, as one might expect.
This concludes our presentation on control systems-rooted
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SUMMARY OF THE THREE PROPOSED ADVERSARIAL DISTURBANCES
Perturbation
Method 푑(푘 + 1) depends on
Compute
time
Attack
strength
푑(푘)
푙2-norm
Gradient
based 퐵(푘 + 1, 푒(푘 + 1), 0) ⭑⭑⭑ ⭑⭑⭑ ⭑⭐⭐
Fixed-point
disturbance 퐵(푘 + 1, 푒(푘 + 1), 훿(푘 + 1)) ⭑⭐⭐ ⭑⭑⭑ ⭑⭑⭑
Dynamic
Fixed-Point 퐵(푘, 푒(푘), 훿(푘)) ⭑⭑⭐ ⭑⭑⭐ ⭑⭑⭑
methodologies for constructing adversarial input disturbances.
In the following section, we demonstrate these approaches on
a few different applications involving RNN based classifiers.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Frequency discrimination task
We now revisit the the frequency discrimination task [17],
[18] that we briefly introduced in Section II. In that task, a sine
wave is provided as an input to the RNN which then classifies
it based on its time period. Specifically, sine inputs belong to
one of the two classes: class 0 if the time period is in (5, 6) or
class 1 if the time period lies in (0, 5) ∪ (6, 100). Every sine
input with period 푇 has a random phase shift drawn from (0, 푇 ). The sequence length is 100, and the sinusoids are
sampled at intervals of 0.1.
These inputs enter a GRU layer with hidden states with dimen-
sion 2 followed by a fully-connected softmax layer with output
dimension 2, which represents the classification probabilities
for the two classes. This network is trained using the standard
cross-entropy loss, with equal number of generated training
examples for each class, and has a test accuracy of ≈ 97%.
Throughout the previous sections, we have already seen in
action various attacks (gradient-based, ‘fixed-point’, ‘dynamic
fixed-point’, and optimal) on this model. Therefore, we shall
instead compare our proposed methods here.
We test our attacks on 1000 randomly generated input
signals from each class. Adversarially perturbing nominal
input from class 0 seem to be much easier than perturbing class
1 inputs as indicated by Figure 9 (a) and (b), where a higher
attack success rate is achieved with smaller disturbances for
class 0 inputs. Figure 9 (c) compares the runtimes of the three
methods. The gradient-based method is the fastest requiring
only a single Jacobian computation at each timestep. The
dynamic fixed-point method requires a single evaluation of the
퐵(푡, 푒, 훿) matrix, which in turn requires multiple computations
of the Jacobian matrix for numerical integration, and thus takes
longer than the gradient-based attack. Finally, the fixed-point
attack requires multiple evaluations of the 퐵(푡, 푒, 훿) matrix in
the fixed-point iteration given by equation (15) and thus is
the slowest, as expected. A summary based on these results is
presented in table I.
B. MNIST digit classification
We use MNIST handwritten digit recognition as a second
example here, where the goal is to add small disturbances
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 9. Comparison between the three different adversarial disturbance
computation methods
to the pixels of a greyscale image of a digit between zero
and nine so that the RNN classifier misclassifies it. Although
RNNs are not a traditional choice of neural networks for this
task, they can nevertheless be used for image classification
tasks, by inputting the image one row of pixels at a time thus
resembling a sequence of inputs.
The model consists of an input layer of size 28 representing
rows of a 28x28 pixels image, followed by a vanilla RNN
layer with hidden state dimension of size 56. This layer then
connects to a dense softmax layer of output dimension 10
corresponding to the ten classes representing digits 0 to 9. The
network is trained on 55k images, and achieves an accuracy
of 96% on 10k test images.
Figure 10 shows how the addition of the perturbations to
each pixel causes the network to misclassify the images. The
magnitude of the perturbation added to each pixel is upper
bounded by 0.07, and the attack is untargetted.
As we increase the magnitude of the pixel perturbations, we
see that the network deteriorates in accuracy. Table II shows
the classification accuracy on a set of 10k images obtained by
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Fig. 10. Top row : Correctly classified, unperturbed digits. Bottom row:
Perturbed images that were misclassified. The number indicates the class
assigned to the image, and the percentage is the corresponding classification
probability.
adversarially perturbing the original test dataset.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON ADVERSARIAL INPUTS
Perturbation size 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3
Accuracy 96% 61.34% 29.76% 12.83% 10.29%
C. Human Activity Recognition
Human Activity Recognition (HAR) involves the
identification of actions carried out by a person using
observations of themself and their environment. This typically
involves inertial information from wearable sensors and the
set of activities to be identified may include walking, sitting,
laying down etc. In this experiment, we use the HAR dataset
from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [21] to train a
single-layer GRU network to recognize six different activities,
namely - walking, walking upstairs, walking downstairs,
standing, sitting, and laying down.
The input to the network is a 9-dimensional time-series data
containing filtered sensor signals from tri-axial accelerometer
and gyroscope. The network consists of a single GRU layer
with hidden-state dimension of 50, followed by a dropout
layer with a rate of 0.5. This is then followed by a dense
ReLU-layer with output dimension of 50, and finally a dense
softmax-layer with a 6-dimensional output representing a
distribution over the six activity classes. The trained network
achieves a test accuracy of 93.41%.
To illustrate the fixed-point based adversarial attack on
this network, we consider a targeted attack wherein an input
sequence corresponding to the activity ‘standing’ is perturbed
such that the network classifies the signal as a different,
pre-specified, target class (‘walking’). Figure 11 shows the
adversarial perturbation. The nominal input correctly classified
as ‘standing’ (with probability > 99.99%), is classified as
‘walking’ (with probability > 99.99%) after injecting the
adversarial perturbation.
Table III shows targetted attack success for 300 nominal
input signals sampled randomly from the test dataset. We only
consider those nominal signals for attack that the network
correctly classified without any perturbations, and hence the
diagonal entries are left out since they are by default 100%.
Fig. 11. Standing misclassified as Walking. (Top) Adversarially perturbed
accelerometer signals (in dashed red) vs corresponding nominal, unperturbed
signals (in solid green). (Bottom) Perturbations added to the 9-dimensional
input signal (accelerometer + gyroscope) corresponding to ‘standing’. The 푙∞norm of the disturbance is constrained to lie below 0.15.
TABLE III
TARGETTED ATTACK SUCCESS RATE (%). INTEGER LABELS ARE AS
FOLLOWS. 0: WALKING, 1: WALKING UPSTAIRS, 2: WALKING DOWNSTAIRS,
3: SITTING, 4: STANDING, 5: LAYING
Target class →
Nominal class
↓
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 - 54.84 43.55 17.74 20.97 0
1 46.15 - 30.77 26.92 3.85 5.77
2 50 86.11 - 5.56 0 0
3 11.36 11.36 6.81 - 97.73 0
4 77.27 22.73 29.55 100 - 0
5 0 12.9 0 16.13 0 -
The untargetted success rates for each of the classes 0 to
5 are respectively, 88.71%, 84.61%,86.11%,100%,100%, and
20.97% (an untargetted attack is considered successful if the
network misclassifies the nominal input to any one of the
remaining classes). It is interesting to note the high success
rates of targetted attacks ‘standing’ to ‘sitting’ and ‘sitting’
to ‘standing’, (even after considering error rates of 4.1% and
18.5%, respectively, for unperturbed inputs). This is consistent
with the fact that sitting and standing are very close to one
another, as physical activities.
D. IMDb review sentiment analysis
Sentiment analysis aims at interpreting the subjective
information such as sentiment expressed within textual input
data, and classify them into classes such as positive, negative,
11
or neutral, for example. In this example, we use the Stanford
Large Movie Review Dataset [22] consisting of highly polar
positive and negative movie reviews on IMDb. We use 25000
labelled data for training and testing our model, which we
describe below.
Each textual input consists of a sequence of words and special
characters which are converted into real-valued vectors of
dimension 50, using the pre-trained GloVe word embedding,
with 6 billion tokens and vocabulary size of 400k [23]. These
embedding vectors are then inputted to a single-layer LSTM
with state dimension of 128 (64 hidden and 64 memory
states). A dropout level of 0.75 is applied to the output of this
layer, which is followed by a final softmax layer with output
dimension equal to 2. The test accuracy of the network is
82.7%.
Before we proceed, we would like to highlight an
implementational challenge that separates this particular
example from the previously demonstrated examples.
Although the inputs to the LSTM are real-valued vectors, the
raw input at each timestep belongs to a finite set of words,
which means the word embedding vectors belong to a discrete
and finite set  ⊂ ℝ50.
Fig. 12. Obtaining the set of ‘replacement words’ for each word in the original
review.
Therefore, at any given timestep 푘, the computed adversarial
input 푥̃(푘) corresponding to nominal input 푥(푘) ∈  to the
LSTM layer may not belong to the set  . To overcome this
issue, we may use a heuristic similar to [11], wherein after
computing 푥̃(푘), we pick the adversarial input to be equal to
argmin
푧∈
{‖푧 − 푥(푘)‖},
where  = {푣 ∈ |||(푣 − 푥(푘))푇 (푥̃(푘) − 푥(푘)) ≥ 0}, whichsimply means that we pick an embedding vector closest to the
computed adversarial input that aligns with the perturbation
direction. A second more important challenge however, is to
ensure the new adversarial input, when finally mapped back
to a sentence, remains reasonably readable and fits well with
the rest of the sentence. We achieve this by incorporating the
state-of-the-art language model known as GPT-2 [24], as well
as part-of-speech (POS) tagging provided within the NLTK
package [25] to refine the set  so that newly generated
adversarial sentence appears linguistically correct. Figure 12
explains how the set of possible replacement words at each
timestep 푘 is generated. The set 핊 consists of words that are
similar to and contextually fitting replacements for the current
word 푘, given a 휏 previous words 푥(푘−1), 푥(푘−2), ..., 푥(푘−휏)
in the original review. We choose 휏 to be equal to 4 for our
experiments. Furthermore, since words in the set 핊 are sorted
by relevance, we can pick the top 푀 words in 핊, denoted
by 핊푀 . 푀 is chosen to be 20 in our experiment. Given thecomputed 푥̃(푘) obtained from equation (16), we then pick the
replacement word to the original word 푥(푘) to be:
argmin
푧∈
{‖푧 − 푥(푘)‖},
where the set  now is {푣 ∈ 핊푀 |||(푣 − 푥(푘))푇 (푥̃(푘) − 푥(푘)) ≥
0
}. Note that for this particular application, since the set of
admissible perturbations ( 핊푀 ) is a finite set, one may directlysearch of the best replacement word for 푥(푘) by looking at the
effect that each of the words in 핊푀 has on the current output
푘 of the classifier.
Tables IV and V illustrate adversarial text generation for
sentiment classification. The original reviews are correctly
classified with a very high confidence. The perturbations
in this case are the replacement words, shown as orange
colored text in the original review and blue colored text in
the perturbed review. The perturbed review is then classified
as negative, with very high confidence.
TABLE IV
EXAMPLE OF ATTACK ON NEGATIVE REVIEW
Or
igi
nal
rev
iew
(−
ve)
cla
ssi
fie
dn
ega
tiv
e(
99
.99
%)
this film is really bad, so bad that even christopher lee cannot
save it. a poor story an even poorer script and just plain
bad direction makes this a truly outstanding horror film, the
outstanding part being that it is the only horror film that i
can honestly say i would never ever watch again. this garbage
make plan nine from outerspace look like oscar material.
Per
tur
bed
rev
iew
cla
ssi
fie
dp
osi
tiv
e(
97
.88
%)
this film is really fantastic, so forgive that even christopher
lee cannot believe it. a poor story an utterly poorer script and
slightly plain bad direction adds this a lovely innovative horror
film, the next part being that it is the only horror film that i
can honestly say i would never ever watch again. this garbage
make plan nine from outerspace look like oscar material.
Looking closer at the original and perturbed reviews in
Table IV, the first occurrence of the word “bad” in the original
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negative review is replaced by “fantastic”, however, the attack
doesn’t simply replace ‘negative’ sounding words with positive
words as indicated the other two occurrences of the word
“bad” in the original review. The perturbed review still retains
negative sounding parts of the original review, and yet is able
to fool the LSTM classifier.
TABLE V
EXAMPLE OF ATTACK ON POSITIVE REVIEW
Or
igi
nal
rev
iew
(+
ve)
cla
ssi
fie
dp
osi
tiv
e(
99
.67
%) this film is a great example of fine storytelling. the acting issuperb. the story is inspiring without being overly manipula-
tive or fake. there were a couple points where they probably
made people a tad more good or bad than they really were,
but considering it is a hollywood movie, they showed amazing
restraint. there wasnt a single explosion shown in the movie,
even though they had one opportunity to. the film, while
having suspenseful parts, was not made into an action movie.
the story is thus made to focus on an extraordinary man in
unfortunately ordinary times. well done!
Pe
rtu
rbe
dr
evi
ew
cla
ssi
fie
dn
ega
tiv
e(
99
.94
%) this film is a massive example of fine storytelling. the act-ing is superb. the story is unfolding without losing directly
manipulative or fake. politically reported a couple incidents
where they already expected changes a tad better complex
or negative than they initially suffered, but starting it is a
hollywood movie, they showed playing restraint. really wasnt a
serious explosion rocked in the movie, originally though they
included 50 opportunity to. the film , while writing suspenseful
lines, was already recovered into an action movie. the story is
extremely flawed to focus on an extraordinary man in double
terrible moments. well done!
In these experiments, we have chosen to create our
perturbations by replacing words in the original review
by other, similar words that fit the context of the overall
sentence. There still seems to be instances where our choice
of replacement words does not lead to meaningful sentences,
however. Other works in literature, such as [26], [27], have
considered introducing perturbations into the reviews by
incorrectly spelling out the original words. Since all the
misspelled words get mapped via the word embedding to
the same vector representing a ‘unknown token’ (denoted
as ‘unk’), the goal is then to find positions in the original
review where we can place this ‘unk’ vector to adversarially
impact the network. The original words in those positions
are then simply replaced by their misspelled versions. Such
perturbations can however be easily detected by any spell-
checking software, but still are an interesting type of textual
perturbation.
We would like to stress our algorithm iterates through the
original review only once, and replaces words in the original
review (if at all) as it sees them in sequential order, unlike
the algorithm proposed in [11], which iterates through the
entire sentence, changing one word per iteration until the
review is misclassified.
VI. CONCLUSION
Adversarial examples for neural network based classifi-
cation have received continued interest among the learning
community and yet, have lacked adequate analytical treat-
ment. In this paper, we have provided sufficient conditions
for existence of adversarial perturbations to any given input
sequence to RNNs. Such perturbations can be constructed
easily, and under a limiting condition are equivalent to a
closed-form, gradient based perturbation. Furthermore since
our formulation and analysis is inspired by control theory,
our proposed adversarial perturbations can be constructed
dynamically, at each time step, as the RNN gets its input
sequentially, which is advantageous in two major ways. First,
we do require to know the entire input sequence a priori
for computing these perturbations. And second, our proposed
method for crafting these adversarial additive perturbations
to an input sequence scales linearly with the length of the
sequence. Additionally, we take advantage of our dynamical
systems based approach to show how optimal control may be
used for computing adversarial perturbations. We illustrate this
with some classification examples with varying complexities,
in terms of architecture, and size of inputs and hidden states.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2: We start by writing the dynamics of
the variable 푦(푡, 휖) = 훿(푡, 휖) − ℎ(푡, 푒) and 푒(푡) as follows:
푑푒
푑푡
= 퐹 (푡, 푒, 푦) ≐ 퐴(푡, 푒)푒(푡)
+퐵(푡, 푒, 푦 + ℎ(푡, 푒))(푦 + ℎ(푡, 푒)),
휖
푑푦
푑푡
= 퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 휖)
≐ 훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦 + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒 − 푦 − ℎ(푡, 푒) − 휖 휕ℎ
휕푡
(푡, 푒)
−휖 휕ℎ
휕푒
(푡, 푒)퐹 (푡, 푒, 푦).
Let us consider 푡 and 푒(푡) appearing in 퐺(푡, 푒, 훿, 휖) to be
‘frozen parameters’ and look at the evolution of 푦 on a fast
timescale 휏 = 휖푡:
푑푦
푑휏
= 퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0). (20)
If we now take the Lyapunov function 푉 (푦) = 12‖푦‖2, thenalong the solution 푦(휏) of equation (20), we have
푉̇ = 푦(휏)푇 푑푦
푑휏
= 푦푇퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0)
= −‖푦‖2 + 푦푇 (훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦 + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒 − ℎ(푡, 푒))
= −‖푦‖2 + 푦푇 (훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦 + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒
−훼퐵(푡, 푒, ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒
)
≤ −‖푦‖2 + ‖푦‖ ⋅ ‖훼퐵(푡, 푒, 푦 + ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒
−훼퐵(푡, 푒, ℎ(푡, 푒))푇 푒‖
≤ −‖푦‖2 + 1
2
‖푦‖2 = −1
2
‖푦‖2 = −푉 ,
which implies that 푦(휏) is uniformly exponentially stable, and
satisfies the inequality ‖푦(휏)‖ ≤ ‖푦(0)‖ exp (− 12휏). Using the(easily verifiable) fact that 휕휕푦퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0) has bounded partialderivatives with respect to 푡 and 푒, along with the fact that
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퐺(푡, 푒, 0, 0) = 0 for all 푡 and 푒, we can obtain the following
bounds:
‖휕퐺
휕푦
(푡, 푒, 푦, 휖)‖ = ‖휕퐺
휕푦
(푡, 푒, 푦, 휖) − 휕퐺
휕푦
(푡, 푒, 0, 휖)‖.
Thus, we can use Lemma 9.8 in [20] on slowly-varying
systems, to conclude the existence of a Lyapunov function
푉 (푡, 푒, 푦) such that
푐1‖푦‖2 ≤ 푉 (푡, 푒, 푦) ≤ 푐2‖푦‖2, (21)
휕푉
휕푦 퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0) ≤ −푐3‖푦‖2,‖ 휕푉휕푦 ‖ ≤ 푐4‖푦‖, ‖ 휕푉휕푡 ‖ ≤ 푐5‖푦‖2, ‖ 휕푉휕푒 ‖ ≤ 푐6‖푦‖2.
Taking the time derivative of 푉 (푡, 푒, 푦) we get,
푑푉
푑푡
(푡, 푒, 푦) = 휕푉
휕푡
+ 휕푉
휕푒
퐹 (푡, 푒, 푦) + 1
휖
휕푉
휕푦
퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 휖)
≤ 휕푉
휕푡
+ 휕푉
휕푒
퐹 (푡, 푒, 푦) + 1
휖
휕푉
휕푦
퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0)
+1
휖
휕푉
휕푦
(
퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 휖) − 퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0)
)
.
Now, using the estimates ‖퐹 (푡, 푒, 푦, 휖)‖ ≤ 푘′ and ‖퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 휖)−
퐺(푡, 푒, 푦, 0)‖ ≤ 휖퐿3, along with the norm bounds in equation(21), one obtains
푑푉
푑푡
(푡, 푒, 푦) ≤ 푐5‖푦‖2 + 푐6푘′‖푦‖2 − 푐3휖 ‖푦‖2 + 퐿3푐4‖푦‖
≤ − 푐3
2휖
‖푦‖2 + 퐿3푐4‖푦‖,
if we choose 휖 ≤ 푐32푐5+2푐6푘′ . Thus, from the above inequality,one can bound 푦(푡, 휖) as follows:
‖푦(푡, 휖)‖ ≤√푐2
푐1
exp
(
−
푐3
4푐2휖
푡
)‖푦0‖ + 2푐2푐4퐿3푐1푐3 휖,
for all times 푡 > 0 and initial condition ‖푦0‖ ≤ √ 푐1푐2 . Thiscompletes the proof. □
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